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Abstract
Broadband access provides users with high speed, always-on connectivity to the Internet. Due
to its superiority, broadband is seen as the way for consumers and ﬁrms to exploit the great
potentials of new applications. This has generated a policy debate on how to stimulate adop-
tion of broadband technology. One of the most disputed issues is about competition policies:
these may be intended to promote competition in the Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) segment of
the market (intra-platform competition), or to stimulate entry into the market for alternative
platforms such as cable access or ﬁber optics (inter-platform competition). Using a model of
oligopoly competition between diﬀerentiated products, our paper explicitly studies the eﬀect of
inter and intra platform competition on the diﬀusion of broadband access. The implications of
the model are then tested using data from 14 European countries. The econometric evidence
conﬁrms the results of the theoretical model and indicates that while inter-platform compe-
tition drives broadband adoption, competition in the market for DSL services does not play
a signiﬁcant role. The results also conﬁrm that lower unbundling prices stimulate broadband
uptake.
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The increased importance of information and communication technologies (ICT) as the major
“General Purpose Technology” underlying the knowledge economy and, consequently, the rapid
increase in investment in ICT, are considered by many as the key factor of the acceleration of
productivity growth experienced by the United States during the last decade. Probably, of the
many technologies that fall under the ICT umbrella, Internet is the one that has had the biggest
impact in terms of cost savings and proﬁtability increases in business.1
It is easy, then, to understand why Internet policy is playing a predominant role in many
governments’ agendas; the European Council, recognizing that the contribution of ICT to growth in
Europe was too low and that much more could be expected, set in March 2000 the so-called “Lisbon
strategy”, aimed at making the European Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy by 2010. To achieve this goal, the European Commission and Council draw and
endorsed the eEurope 2002 action plan, focused on extending Internet connectivity and on reducing
access prices.
In order to generate growth, connectivity needs to be translated into economic activities; hence
the strategic importance of ICT for delivering large beneﬁts to consumers in terms of new or
improved products and services.2 The European Council consequently endorsed the eEurope 2005
action plan. The plan is directed at stimulating services, applications and content capable of
creating new markets and reducing costs, thanks to two new technological developments (deemed
able to further expanding the potentialities of the Net): multi-platform access/convergence and
broadband. For this reason, the main objective of the 2005 action plan is to get a widespread
availability of broadband access at competitive prices in Europe by 2005.
Broadband diﬀusion policies are being put in place not only in consideration of the economic and
social relevance of providing business and residential users with high speed access technologies, but
also because there is a widespread concern (see inter alios Liikanen, 2001; Lieberman, 2002) that
broadband diﬀusion is taking place too slowly, or at least more slowly than originally predicted.3
1Varian et al. (2002) estimated that the adoption of Internet business solutions had yielded to US organizations,
from the ﬁrst year of implementation through 2001, cumulative cost savings of $155.2 billion and increased revenues
of $444 billion.
2Crandall et al. (2002), for example, report that in US consumer beneﬁts from universal broadband deployment,
that is to say 94% of US households, which is the current level of telephone service, could easily be $300 billion a
year and that 50% deployment would result in beneﬁts of around $100 billion annually (beneﬁts increase nonlinearly
due to network eﬀects).
3It should be pointed out that other authors disagree with this view, notably Odlyzko (2003); empirical evidence
shows that broadband take-up is actually happening quite at a fast pace relative to the adoption of similar communi-
cation technologies. For example, OECD (2003b) shows that at the end of 2003, seven years after the introduction of
1Public initiatives implemented by central and local governments to promote broadband adoption
can be directed at stimulating either demand or supply. Policies directed at ﬁnancially assisting
ﬁnal users (like subsidies and tax savings) together with public demand aggregation have been
extensively used in many countries to support demand; policies aimed at assisting the build up of
broadband networks or at enhancing competition through telecom markets openness and access to
infrastructures (like compulsory unbundling of the local loop, shared access and wholesaling) have
been adopted to stimulate supply.
There is a general consensus on the idea that competition, is one of the main drivers of the
adoption of broadband technologies (see e.g. OECD, 2001, 2002, 2003a). In these oﬃcial docu-
ments particularly debated is the issue of the diﬀerent available options to induce competition in
the market for broadband access. In particular, whether competition should be introduced and
promoted between diﬀerent technological platforms able to oﬀer broadband access (inter-platform
competition) or within the same platform (intra-platform competition).4
The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of competition in promoting broadband adoption.
Using a model of oligopoly competition between diﬀerentiated products, our paper explicitly stud-
ies the distinct eﬀects of inter and intra-platform competition on the diﬀusion of broadband access.
The empirical evidence, using data available for 14 European countries, supports the theoretical pre-
dictions of the model and establishes inter-platform competition as the main driver for broadband
adoption while competition within the DSL segment of the market seems to play a less signiﬁcant
role. Our evidence also conﬁrms that a lower price of local loop unbundling stimulates broadband,
while granting rights of way and digging permits to Internet broadband providers through a central
authority has not played a signiﬁcant role.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we describe the most common
broadband technologies, while Section 3 brieﬂy reviews the literature on broadband diﬀusion. The
theoretical model of oligopoly competition is introduced in Section 4, and its main implications are
empirically tested in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we draw some concluding remarks. All the
proofs are contained in the Appendix.
broadband access services, the number of broadband subscribers across OECD countries exceeded by a considerable
amount that of subscribers to mobile phone services, to analogic and Individual Subscriber Digital Number (ISDN)
dial-up access services at the same stage of market development.
4Given the actual state of the market for broadband access, this form of competition seems to be relevant only
within the DSL segment of the market.
22 Broadband technologies
Despite all the documented interest in promoting broadband access, there is still no agreement on
the deﬁnition of broadband. In fact, deﬁnitions given by governments and international institutions
usually vary. For example, the International Telecommunications Union deﬁnes broadband as a
technology providing a transmission capacity that is faster then primary rate ISDN (1:5 or 2 Mbps),
while OECD deﬁnes broadband as a technology providing downstream speed in excess of 256 Kbps
(and upstream access speed in excess of 128 Kbps). Other governments and institutions, given the
fast pace of technical progress in ICT, prefer not to specify any speed or technical requirement, and
their deﬁnitions mainly rely on the services that can be provided over broadband. In this paper,
given the broad variety of broadband products delivered over diﬀerent networks available to end
users, we adopt an unrestrictive deﬁnition. Broadband is identiﬁed with any access technology that
guarantees the ﬁnal customers connections (in terms of speed of data transfer) to the net of greater
quality than traditional analogic or ISDN modems dial-up technologies. All the technologies brieﬂy
described below satisfy our deﬁnition.
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) The most popular broadband technology, it converts the stan-
dard telephone line into a high speed digital line by transmitting data at higher frequencies
than those used for voice. For this reason DSL technologies allow for simultaneous use of voice
telephony and data services. There are various forms of DSL: Asymmetric DSL (ADSL), High
Rate DSL (HDSL), Symmetric DSL (SDSL) and Very High Data Rate DSL (VDSL), which
are able to provide connection speeds ranging from 256 Kbps to 52 Mbps.5
Cable modem A broadband technology that uses access lines for cable television (CATV). Al-
though traditional CATV networks need to be upgraded with a separate voice line to provide
interactive communication services like telephony and Internet access, new networks use the
same coaxial cable to provide simultaneous transmission of data, television and voice. Con-
nection speeds range from 1 to 10 Mbps.
Fibre to the home (FTTH) A Fibre optic technology similar to standard cable that allows for
transmission speeds of up to 10 Gbps. Fiber optic cables are rolled out up to home of the
consumer and can carry video, data, voice and interactive video-telephone services.
Satellite A broadband technology that uses satellite TV equipment to carry data. At the moment
the majority of services based on satellite technology are one-way (i.e. they only allow for
5At the moment of writing this paper the most popular DSL retail oﬀers range between 640 Kbps and 1.2 Mbps.
3downstream transmission) and need a dial-up connection for the return channel. The down-
stream speed ranges between 300 Kbps and 2 Mbps. This technology is considered to be
particularly eﬀective for servicing rural areas where other technologies are too expensive to
be put in place.
Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) A technology, initially deployed as an alternative to the local
copper loop, which uses radio links between a base station and a receiving antenna located in
the customer’s premises. It allows for simultaneous transmission of voice and data and can
reach speeds of over 2 Mbps.
Power lines communications (PLC) A broadband technology that relies on the existing elec-
tricity distribution network to transmit data at speeds comparable to those oﬀered by DSL.
This technology is still in the testing phase of development and, given the ubiquity of the
power network (as e.g. satellite), looks particularly promising for deploying broadband in
rural areas.
In addition to these technologies listed above there are a few others belonging to the family of
mobile technologies (e.g. “third generation”) and some other deﬁned as “nomadic” (e.g. radio-
LANs). Although very promising in terms of connection speed and deployment, they are, like
FWA and PLC, still conﬁned to a small number of adopters. It is for this reason that in our
empirical analysis we will use data concerning only DSL, cable, ﬁber and satellite technologies.
3 Review of the literature
Broadband is still at its infancy and there are only few empirical studies available on broadband
diﬀusion. Bauer et al. (2003) presented a cross-national study of broadband uptake in the 30
OECD countries. Due to problems of data availability which restricts the analysis to year 2001,
the authors estimate a cross sectional model which does not capture the dynamic evolution of the
broadband market. The aim of the authors was to study the main drivers inﬂuencing broadband
penetration; among the regressors they included the price of broadband, the price of dial-up services
and a variable indicating the competitive conditions in the broadband market. Quite surprisingly,
all these variables came out to be statistically insigniﬁcant.6 This result is probably due to the
lack of time–series data. Like any process of new technology diﬀusion, broadband adoption is a
dynamic process that evolves through time and this crucial feature is not taken into account in the
estimated cross-sectional model.
6The fully speciﬁed model yielded signiﬁcant parameters only for two variables: population density and a variable
called “preparedness”, intended to capture the attitudes of a population towards information technology.
4An interesting investigation, more closely related to ours, is presented in Aron and Burnstein
(2003). These authors estimate the inﬂuence of availability, competition and demographics on the
adoption of broadband technology in 46 US states. The paper focuses on the eﬀect of inter-platform
competition on broadband penetration relative to the eﬀect of simple broadband availability (i.e.
when only one platform is available); other variables included in the regressors are the price for
unbundled local loop, the number of Internet access and the level of education. The authors ﬁnd
that inter-platform competition, mainly between cable and DSL technologies, has a positive and
signiﬁcant impact on broadband adoption. Again, the model estimated by Aron and Burnstein
(2003) is a cross-sectional one and therefore it is a static model; furthermore, apart from the
role of local loop unbundling, the authors do not explicitly analyse the impact of intra-platform
competition on broadband uptake, which represents a relevant policy issue currently under scrutiny.
Garcia-Murillo and Gabel (2003) study the stimulating role of unbundling policies and other
regulatory activities in local telecommunications. Their study includes 135 countries, with obser-
vations restricted to the year 2001. In their paper, the authors do not distinguish between inter
and intra-platform competition when trying to estimate the determinants of broadband adoption.
Quite surprisingly, Garcia-Murillo and Gabel do not ﬁnd evidence of a positive role of unbundling
policies towards broadband adoption; stronger evidence is found on the role of competition.
A diﬀerent issue is tackled in Hausman et al. (2001) where the authors focus on the deﬁnitions
of the boundaries of the broadband market. The aim of the paper is to understand the economic
incentives of the providers of broadband access to limit the usage of broadband access and to
verify the existence of signiﬁcant providers’ market power. A related and extremely debated issue
is then to test the hypothesis that narrowband and broadband access are two separated markets;
interestingly, Hausman et al. (2001) show that the price of narrowband dial-up access does not
constrain the prices charged for broadband access, thus supporting the hypothesis that markets are
separated.
Finally, various papers use population survey data to analyse the inﬂuence of demographic
characteristics on individual’s decisions to adopt broadband; Stanton (2004) and Rappoport et al.
(2002) are two of the most recent papers of this emerging literature.
The picture emerging from the reviewed literature seems to be that the determinants of broad-
band adoption are still a question open to debate; in particular there are no empirical studies
providing evidence on the impact of diﬀerent competition policies on the adoption of broadband
access technologies in a more dynamic context. In our paper we focus on the role of inter-platform
versus intra-platform competition and on the inﬂuence of unbundling policies; the analytical results
of a model of platform competition are outlined in the next section.
54 A simple model of platform competition
In order to stimulate adoption of broadband technologies, governments have adopted various ini-
tiatives usually intended to promote competition in the access market.
As previously mentioned, a common practice to entice competition in the market for broadband
access services is to mandate incumbent telecom carriers to unbundle their local loop and to pro-
vide interconnection to any Internet Service Provider (ISP) demanding access at a predetermined-
regulated price. Since local loop unbundling allows competitive ISPs to provide DSL services resting
on existing network infrastructure, it represents the easiest and the quickest policy to stimulate
entry into the market for broadband-DSL services. Alternatively, governments may promote com-
petition into markets for cable or ﬁber optics access through investment subsidies or tax reductions.
In this case, cable and ﬁber optic providers need to incur in relevant investments to build their
new infrastructures and this makes these alternative forms of broadband access of less immediate
availability to ﬁnal customers.
It is often claimed among practitioners and policy makers that broadband adoption can be stim-
ulated more eﬀectively promoting competition between diﬀerent platforms (inter-platform compe-
tition), rather than focusing on the market for DSL services (intra-platform competition).7 One
of the aim of the paper is to look for a theoretically supported empirical evidence to this claim.
For this reason we devote this section to develop an extremely stylised model of intra-platform vs.
inter-platform competition; the scope of this model is to provide a simple theoretical background
for the empirical analysis conducted in the next section.
We proceed by following a standard model of oligopoly competition between diﬀerentiated
products. Let us assume that broadband access is provided only through two technologies, i.e.
DSL and cable; this assumption can be easily justiﬁed by observing that DSL and cable are the
two most common broadband access technologies in Europe; furthermore, it allows us to keep the
model at a reasonable level of complexity.
Let us assume that DSL and cable access are provided by n and m ﬁrms respectively. Finally,
according to the observation that the market for DSL is generally more competitive than the market
for alternative technologies, we also assume that n > m > 0.
It is reasonable to assume homogeneity between ﬁrms belonging to the same technology and
product diﬀerentiation across technologies. Although from the point of view of the quality of service
the gap between DSL and cable is reducing over time,8 diﬀerences still exist between platforms due
7See DotEcon and Criterion Economics (2003).
8As seen in section 2, the average access speed of DSL technologies is becoming comparable with that of cable
technologies.
6to their intrinsic technological characteristics. For example, usually cable technologies allow the
same speed of transmission in both upload and download; for this reason they are generally preferred
by users that do not access the Internet simply for browsing or downloading ﬁles or mail.9 Another
characteristic that makes DSL diﬀerent from both cable and satellite is that these latter allow the
convergence of diﬀerent telecommunications services (Internet, telephony and broadcasting) on a
single platform.10
In order to capture the various dimensions of product diﬀerentiation across technologies in
a fairly general and simple way, we apply to this framework a standard approach of product
diﬀerentiation11 and we model demand for DSL and cable technologies as
pd = ® ¡ ¯Q ¡ °Y;
and
pc = ® ¡ °Q ¡ ¯Y;
where Q =
Pn
i qi and Y =
Pm
j yj represent the total amount of DSL and cable access demanded,
qi and yj denote the amount of access provided respectively by the individual ﬁrm i and j, and
ﬁnally pd and pc refer to the respective prices.
Imperfect substitutability across technologies is easily incorporated by assuming that the own
price eﬀect dominates, i.e. ¯ > ° > 0: the impact of increasing DSL (resp. cable) access on the
price for DSL (resp. cable) is larger than the eﬀect of the same increase in cable (resp. DSL).
On the cost side, each ISP providing DSL services has to pay the incumbent ﬁrm for the
unbundled local loop. The price of the local loop is usually made of a ﬁxed and a variable part,
where this latter depends on the amount of bandwidth purchased. For the sake of simplicity, we do
not explicitly include the one-oﬀ charge in the model and consider a constant variable and marginal
access charge, indicated by c.
A ﬁrm providing cable broadband does not need access to the local loop of the telecom network;
as it has been already discussed above, although cable providers often lease lines from the incumbent
telecom operator, they mainly have to build their own infrastructure to serve the market. Formally,
we assume that a cable provider does not have marginal cost but only a ﬁxed cost of entry, indicated
by F.12
9Jackson et al. (2002) have estimated the willingness to pay for various broadband services of diﬀerent classes of
business users and they have found that while SOHOs strongly prefer DSL to cable, small and medium enterprises
do not show a clear pattern of preference among technologies.
10A consumer, once subscribed the various communication services from a single ﬁrm, the so called ”one-stop”
shop, has to deal with only one provider; this is considered by many consumers a valuable option.
11See Shy (1995).
12Note that also DSL ﬁrms may incur in ﬁxed costs; these costs, that do not play any role in this stylised framework
7Our framework is extremely stylised. In particular, it should be noted that we do not explicitly
model the presence of an incumbent ﬁrm; this is equivalent to assume that the incumbent telecom
operator receives the payments for unbundling its local loop from DSL ﬁrms, but it does not
compete with them in the broadband market. This is clearly unrealistic, but it helps to keep
the model tractable. Also, despite an increased complexity, the model with an incumbent ﬁrm
providing access to its downstream rivals does not qualitatively alter our results; for this reason
we have decided to present the simpliﬁed version and to leave the treatment of the model with the
incumbent ﬁrm available upon request.13
According to the assumptions detailed above, individual ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
¼d = (pd ¡ c)qi; ¼c = pcyj ¡ F;
where, as above, the subscript d refers to DSL and c to cable. Each ﬁrm sets its quantity in order
to maximise proﬁts. Solving the ﬁrst order conditions,14 it is easy to derive the total amount of
broadband access BB = Q + Y at the symmetric equilibrium:15
BB(c;n;m) =
n(®° m ¡ ¯ (® ¡ c)(1 + m))
°2mn ¡ ¯2 (1 + n)(1 + m)
+
m(° (® ¡ c)n ¡ ®¯ (1 + n))
°2mn ¡ ¯2 (1 + n)(1 + m)
: (1)
Clearly, total access depends on the price for local loop unbundling, c, and on the degree of compe-
tition between ﬁrms providing DSL and cable services respectively, here represented by the number
of ﬁrms in the two markets, n and m.
In order to reconcile our theoretical predictions with the results of the empirical analysis pro-
vided in the next section, it is useful to discuss in details the two concepts of intra and inter-platform
anyway, are usually smaller than those incurred by cable ﬁrms since DSL ﬁrms do not have the necessity to build their
network and can mainly have interconnection with the existing telecom infrastructures. For simplicity we normalise
them to zero: F can be interpreted as the diﬀerence in ﬁxed costs between DSL and cable ﬁrms. As for marginal
costs, also cable ﬁrms often have to pay the incumbent network for leased lines; for similar reasons as above, these
costs are generally lower than those incurred by DSL ﬁrms for the unbundled local loop. Therefore we may again
interpret c as the diﬀerence in marginal costs between DSL and cable ﬁrms.
13The model with an incumbent DSL ﬁrm can be downloaded at www.decon.unipd.it/manenti.
14The ﬁrst order conditions are
d¼d
dqi
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It is immediate to check that second order conditions are satisﬁed.
15Obtained by setting qi = q and yj = y.
8competition. In the empirical exercise we measure the degree of intra and inter-platform competi-
tion using the Herﬁndhal index (HHI), which is usually deﬁned as a sum of ﬁrms’ squared market
size.
The HHI measuring the degree of competition between DSL ﬁrms (intra-platform) is simply the







Conversely, we measure the degree of competition across platforms using the following “inter-






where Q and Y represent respectively total DSL and cable access, and BB is the total broadband
access sold at the equilibrium, as from expression (1).16
The evidence from the data, discussed in detail in the next section, reveals that on aggregate
intra-platform concentration decreases, conﬁrming a common increasing degree of competition in
the DSL segment of the market. Conversely, a similar uniform trend is not observed for inter-
platform competition: although HHIinter goes down in most of the countries of the sample, it
increases in others (namely Denmark, Ireland, Finland and France).
By construction, HHIintra takes the value of 1 when the market for DSL services is entirely
controlled by a single ﬁrm, and it decreases as concentration reduces. At the symmetric equilibrium,
HHIintra reduces to 1=n: as n increases, intra-platform competition also increases and the relevant
HHI decreases accordingly.17
Similarly, HHIinter is equal to 1 when the entire access occurs through a single platform (i.e.
“interplatform” concentration is at its maximum), while it takes the value of 1/2 when the two
technologies are evenly adopted. Nevertheless, the relationship between the degree of competition
16Note that while HHIintra provides a relative measure of concentration within the DSL technology, HHIinter is a
more general measure of the absolute concentration of broadband market. A more comprehensive analysis would have
required the use of the Herﬁndhal indices also for the segments of cable and other access technologies. Unfortunately,
due to a lack of data regarding the number of ﬁrms providing access through cable and ﬁber optics technologies in
each country, we are not able to compute the concentration indices for these alternative forms of broadband access.
We are aware of the complexities of capturing competitive conditions and ﬁrms’ behaviour by means of the number
and relative size of ﬁrms, nevertheless the Herﬁndhal index was the most eﬀective statistical indicator of competitive
stances that we were able to build from our dataset.
17This is true also in the case of an incumbent ﬁrm that unbundles the local loop to its rivals: in this case, for given
c, as n increases, the incumbent’s market share in the market for DSL lines decreases and intra-platform concentration
also decreases. See the extend version of the model available at www.decon.unipd.it/manenti.
9between DSL and cable ﬁrms, here represented by n and m, and HHIinter deﬁned in (2) is a
bit more intricate. Inter-platform concentration may vary either because n changes or because m
changes or because they both change.
Let dn and dm indicate respectively the variations in the number of ﬁrms providing DSL and
cable; according to the current trend in the market for Internet broadband access, both the market
of DSL and that of cable access (more generally, the alternative technologies) are experiencing
growing competitive conditions. Without loss of relevance, we can restrict our model to the case of
dn > 0 and dm > 0; this implies that HHIinter may increase or decrease depending on the relative
magnitude of dn and dm. Formally, in our symmetric framework, two situations may emerge:18
1. dHHIinter < 0; this may occur if:
a. DSL is the dominant technology, Q > Y and dm > dn > 0: in this case both Q and
Y may increase but cable market share increases relatively to DSL and inter-platform
concentration decreases.
b. Cable is the dominant technology, Y > Q and dn > dm > 0: in this case both Q
and Y may increase but DSL market share increases relatively to cable and, again,
concentration decreases.
2. dHHIinter > 0; following exactly the opposite arguments applied above, this may occur if
c. Q > Y and dn > dm > 0.
d. Y > Q and dm > dn > 0.
More generally, as the number of providers, either cable or DSL, gets larger, inter-platform
concentration decreases as long as the market for the dominant technology experiences an increase
in the number of ﬁrms which is smaller than the increase in the market for the alternative platform.
Note that scenarios b. and d. are of less practical relevance. Apart from Austria and the
Netherlands, DSL is by far the dominant technology in Europe; even in the UK, where cable access
has historically been very popular, DSL is nowadays the most widespread way of gaining broadband
access to the Internet. Accordingly, the theoretical model focuses on the case of Q > Y .
We are now ready to derive some testable remarks; remarks 1 and 2 highlight the role of local
loop unbundling on broadband diﬀusion while remark 3, and the subsequent corollary, focus on the
distinct eﬀects of intra and inter-platform competition.
18A detailed analysis of how variations in n and m aﬀect HHIinter is given in the appendix.




Remark 2. A reduction in the price of LLU may be more eﬀective in promoting broadband the












n(® ¡ c)[n®(¯ ¡ °) + c°n + ¯®]
m®[(® ¡ c)¯(m + 1) ¡ °®m)]
> G =
n°(¯ + n(¯ ¡ °))
¯(m + 1)(¯ + m(¯ ¡ °))
> 0:
Notice that c represents a cost for each DSL ﬁrm; therefore the intuition for Remark 1 is obvious:
a lower price of LLU enhances the competitive position of DSL ﬁrms and this translates into more
broadband access sold in the retail market.
According to Remark 2, the stimulating eﬀect of a reduction of the price of LLU on broadband
adoption may be more pronounced the higher the degree of inter-platform competition. The prac-
tical implication of Remark 2 is that a policy aimed at lowering the price of LLU may be reinforced
by pro-competitive measures aimed at stimulating competition between diﬀerent platforms; this
result, that may sound counterintuitive, shows that under certain circumstances these two policies
may actually go in the same direction.
The last remark emphasizes the role of inter-platform vs intra-platform competition in stimu-
lating broadband.
Remark 3. The lower the Herﬁndhal indices, relative to both inter and intra-platform concentra-







Remark 3 states that, as long as concentration in the two segments of the market decreases,
broadband adoption increases; the intuition is obvious: competition induces prices to fall and it
stimulates adoption. From this remark, a relevant observation follows:
11Corollary 1. Provided that markets become less concentrated, inter-platform competition may be

















Both inter-platform and intra-platform competition stimulate adoption through low prices; nev-
ertheless, when not accompanied by a similar pro-competitive policy in the cable segment of the
market (formally, when dn=dm is large enough), the impact of intraDSL competition may be par-
tially or entirely smoothed by the negative impact induced by a larger inter-platform concentration.
The message is therefore clear: stimulating entry of ﬁrms providing DSL access (the dominant tech-
nology) certainly induces a decrease in intra-platform concentration, and this has a “direct” positive
eﬀect on total broadband. Nevertheless, this policy has also an “indirect” eﬀect that goes in the
opposite direction: the induced increase in concentration across platforms may slow down broad-
band uptake. When dn=dm > ˜ G, these two eﬀects go against each other and an eﬀective policy
should therefore be aimed at balancing entry in the DSL and in the cable segments of the market,
thus exploiting the potentials of both increased inter-platform and intra-platform competition.
The results and implications of this theoretical model are tested in the next section, through
an empirical analysis based on data from a sample of EU countries.
5 Evidence from an empirical analysis
5.1 The data
Our panel dataset was built by joining data and information coming from diﬀerent sources con-
cerning the three broad categories of users and infrastructures, prices and regulatory policies. In
particular, all data related to the number of analogic and ISDN digital lines (as well as the num-
ber of DSL, CATV, broadband upgraded CATV, ﬁber optic and satellite lines) were taken from
Telecom Markets, a telecom industry newsletter providing quarterly data and statistics detailing
ﬁxed-line subscribers and infrastructures broken down by technology. All data on input prices such
as unbundling of the local loop, shared access, leased lines one-oﬀ and recurring fees, as well as data
on the regulation of the rights of way, were taken from the annual reports on the implementation
of the telecommunications regulatory package of the European Commission.19 In many cases data
19In particular, data for year 2000 were taken from the sixth report, data for year 2001 from the seventh report
and so on until year 2003.
12from reports of the European Commission were complemented with data taken from The Cross
Country Analysis, a bi-monthly publication which provides an overview of the telecom’s regulatory
situation of Western European Countries.
The dataset contains information on the following countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE),
Denmark (DK), France (FR), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg
(LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE) and United Kingdom (UK), that
is to say all EU-15 countries except Greece, for which we had diﬃculties in obtaining reliable data
on the number of broadband lines. Each country was observed in quarterly time intervals during
the period going from the fourth quarter of year 2000 — there are no reliable sources of data on
the diﬀusion of broadband access lines before that date — until the second quarter of 2004, that is
the latest period for which data were available at the moment of writing this paper. Our data are
available over 15 time periods and 14 countries, but the panel is unbalanced,20 resulting in a total
of 158 observations.
In order to investigate empirically the relationships between broadband uptake and inter/intra
platform competition we have built the variables listed below.
PENBB A measure of broadband penetration. Unlike traditional measures of penetration, which
weight the number of units of a certain product sold in the market by total population or
number of households, our weights the number of broadband lines by the total number of
access lines. The number of lines is obtained by dividing the sum of DSL, Cable TV, ﬁber
optic and satellite lines by the the sum of twisted pair copper lines, cable TV lines, ﬁber optic
and satellite lines. Thus, strictu sensu, our indicator measures the number of all possible
access lines that have been upgraded to transmit high-speed data.
INTRA An index measuring the level of market concentration/competition within the DSL tech-
nological platform. As already mentioned in Section 4 our measure of competition (or the
lack thereof) is the standard Herﬁndhal index.
INTER An index measuring the level of market competition/concentration across diﬀerent tech-
nological platforms. As already mentioned, we measure competition (or the lack thereof)
across diﬀerent technological platforms using a particular version of the Herﬁndhal index
which is not computed over ﬁrms’ market shares, but over technologies’ market shares.
ROW1 A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 when rights of way and digging permits over
public land are granted by a single central authority and 0 when rights of way are granted by
local authorities.
20Because, for example, not all the countries had mandated local loop unbundling as early as at the end of 2000.
13ROW2 A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 when operators experience delays in getting
rights of way or digging permits and 0 when no delays are reported.
LLU12 A variable that measures the price of an unbundled copper local loop. It is obtained by
adding one third of the one-oﬀ charge to the yearly fee (i.e. the yearly quota of the one-oﬀ
charge).21
LLP A variable that measures the price of a leased line. It is obtained by adding the one-oﬀ fee
to the annual charge of 2 kilometers 2Mbps leased line.
LCC The price of a ten minutes local call on the incumbent’s ﬁxed network (including the call
set-up fee).
Table 1: Number of DSL and alternative BB subscriptions, and measures of platform competition
in Europe
DSL NODSL HHIintra HHIinter
’01q2 ’02q4 ’04q1 ’01q2 ’02q4 ’04q1 ’01q2 ’02q4 ’04q1 ’01q2 ’02q4 ’04q1
AT 69,600 179,600 314,800 122,000 277,000 355,000 0.88 0.68 0.60 0.54 0.52 0.50
BE 94,000 519,100 905,000 180,000 353,481 517,000 0.68 0.73 0.69 0.55 0.52 0.54
DE 1,350,000 3,295,000 4,885,000 24,300 53,800 100,000 1.00 0.89 0.82 0.97 0.97 0.96
DK 74,516 306,944 518,000 59,034 151,415 230,580 0.51 0.69 0.67 0.51 0.56 0.57
ES 157,702 960,303 1,871,613 54,000 344,981 598,000 0.78 0.64 0.67 0.62 0.61 0.63
FI 27,400 219,000 500,000 25,000 54,000 96,000 0.59 0.68 0.67 0.50 0.68 0.73
FR 177,000 1,410,358 3,665,010 163,302 282,992 431,000 0.82 0.59 0.51 0.50 0.72 0.81
IE 0 3,300 32,100 0 7,300 8,390 0.68 0.52 0.57 0.67
IT 239,000 925,000 2,865,000 14,500 88,050 173,190 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.89 0.84 0.89
LU 550 6,822 16,080 20 150 510 1.00 0.93 0.70 0.93 0.96 0.94
NL 62,000 333,000 951,000 300,000 760,809 998,000 0.94 0.58 0.52 0.72 0.58 0.50
PT 1,000 52,044 238,341 55,765 207,486 339,345 0.91 0.70 0.75 0.97 0.68 0.52
SE 93,765 419,000 564,500 165,250 291,400 419,000 0.96 0.63 0.61 0.54 0.52 0.51
UK 72,000 590,100 2,234,850 76,892 781,819 1,490,300 0.58 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.52
In Table 1 we present some ﬁgures on the evolution of inter and intra platform competition in the
14 European countries over the time considered by our analysis.22 The table shows a general trend
21We are therefore distributing the common cost of the one-oﬀ charge over three years.
22Table 1 shows only three time observations of the 14 time observations of our dataset.
14toward a more competitive DSL market. In fact, apart from a few exceptions – namely Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, and Italy – all countries have experienced decreasing levels of concentration in
the DSL segment of the market. The dynamic of inter-platform competition is generally slower
than that of intra-platform competition. In some countries, such as Denmark, Spain, Finland and
France, the Herﬁndhal Index for inter-platform concentration has actually increased through time,
suggesting a worsening of the competitive conditions across alternative platforms. The diﬃculties of
fostering and establishing competition between diﬀerent access technologies can easily be explained
by the magnitude of the investments necessary to deploy alternative infrastructures. This also
explains why at the end of the period that we consider, DSL is the dominant technology in the
majority of the countries.
5.2 Econometric speciﬁcation and estimation results
In order to test the implications of the theoretical model presented above, an econometric anal-
ysis has been conducted, based on the evidence obtained for the mentioned 14 EU countries. In
particular, the following models have been estimated:
PENBBi;t = const + time eﬀects + ¯1LLPi;t + ¯2LLU12i;t + ¯3LCCi;t
+¯4ROW1i;t + ¯5ROW2i;t + ¯6INTRAi;t + ¯7INTERi;t
+¯8INTERi;t ¤ LLPi;t + ¯9INTERi;t ¤ LLU12i;t + "i;t; (3)
PENBBi;t = const + time eﬀects + ¯1LLPi;t + ¯2LLU12i;t + ¯3LCCi;t
+¯4INTRAi;t + ¯5INTERi;t + ¯6INTERi;t ¤ LLPi;t
+¯7INTERi;t ¤ LLU12i;t + "i;t; (4)
and
PENBBi;t = const + time eﬀects + ¯1LLPi;t + ¯2LLU12i;t + ¯3LCCi;t
+¯4INTRAi;t + ¯5INTERi;t + ¯6INTERi;t ¤ LLPi;t
+¯7INTERi;t ¤ LLU12i;t + ¯8GDPPCi;t + "i;t; (5)
where "i;t is an error term and model (5) controls for GDP per capita (in real terms). Models (3),
(4) and (5) can be estimated using well known panel data techniques.23 Time trend components
23The theoretical model described in Section 4 is static; therefore static regressions have been estimated. Using
dynamic panel data techniques, also a dynamic version of the model has been estimated, by including the lagged
value of PENBBi;t among the regressors. However, the test for the validity of the moment restrictions imposed by
the resulting generalized method of moments estimator massively rejects the null hypothesis and therefore the results
of the dynamic regression are statistically insigniﬁcant.
15have been accounted for including time eﬀects in the estimated equations. As for the constant
term, both the Fixed Eﬀects (FE) and Random Eﬀects (RE) speciﬁcations have been estimated
and tested. Also, given the way the measures of inter and intra platform competition have been
constructed, there may be some concerns as to what extent they can be treated as exogenous vari-
ables. Therefore an Instrumental Variable (IV) regression has been performed, instrumenting the
competition measures with their lagged values. Finally, we explicitly treat the price of unbundling
the local loop, LLU12, as exogenous, since this variable is typically regulated and therefore is not
endogenously determined. The results of the estimation exercise, reported in Table 2, reveal some
interesting facts and provides answers to the implications of the theoretical model of Section 4.
First, as predicted by Remark 1, the price of the local loop unbundling has a negative eﬀect on
the diﬀusion of the broadband. This conﬁrms the importance of local loop unbundling, which is
one of the main strategies adopted by competitive broadband access providers in the DSL segment
of the market: the price that they pay for each unbundled line aﬀects directly their operating costs.
Also, strictly related to this ﬁnding is the negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the price of leased
lines. These are in fact an important input for the provision of DSL services and therefore are
expected to be inversely related to the diﬀusion of broadband services.
The price of local calls is, as expected, positively related with the diﬀusion of broadband (except
for model (3) estimated with IV). In fact, being the primary vehicle through which narrow band
Internet access is provided, an increase in the price of local calls should push customers towards
the adoption of broadband access to the Internet. The sign shows that the price of narrow band
Internet access constrains the diﬀusion (through the price) of broadband access, but the fact that
the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant conﬁrms some previous ﬁndings in related literature
which place the two products in separate markets.24
The coeﬃcient related to the ﬁrst Rights of Way variable has the expected sign (in fact one
should expect less delay under centralised authority granting rights of way to broadband access
providers), but is not statistically signiﬁcant (except in the FE regression) and it seems that, at
least at this stage, centralisation of provision of the rights of way has not played a signiﬁcant role in
the diﬀusion of broad band technology. The same can be said about the second coeﬃcient related
to the granting of the Rights of Ways: the coeﬃcient is negative as expected (except in the FE
regression), but once again it is not statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore the variables indicating the
concession of Rights of Way are dropped in the alternative speciﬁcations of the model (4) and (5).
The Herﬁndhal index expressing the level of concentration between alternative technological
24DotEcon and Criterion Economics (2003) indicate that the extent of substitutability between narrow band and
broadband access services is quite limited and only in the direction from narrow band to broadband; in any case, it
is insuﬃcient to suggest that they lie in the same relevant market. Similar evidence is in Hausman et al. (2001).
16platforms is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the theoretical
model, namely those of Remark 3. Therefore competition between diﬀerent platforms seems to
be one of the main drivers of broadband uptake. This is an interesting result and it provides a
statistical support to what has been often claimed by industry experts (see DotEcon and Criterion
Economics, 2003).
The coeﬃcient of Herﬁndhal index expressing the level of concentration within within the DSL
segment of the market is positive, but insigniﬁcant. Also, it is numerically much smaller than the one
related to the inter-platform concentration index and very close to zero; this supports the theoretical
prediction provided in Corollary 1. The intuition behind this result is that, although competition
between DSL ﬁrms can potentially play an important role in promoting broadband diﬀusion, this
eﬀect seems to be completely overwhelmed by the negative“indirect” eﬀect of increased inter-
platform concentration induced by promoting entry into the DSL segment of the market.25
The terms involving cross products between the LLP, LLU12 and the inter-platform measure of
concentration are both positive and signiﬁcant. This implies that the positive eﬀect on broadband
diﬀusion of lower prices of LLU will be more pronounced the lower the degree of concentration across
markets. The implications of these empirical ﬁndings seem to be consistent with the theoretical
predictions of the model. In particular, the stimulating eﬀect of a reduction in the price of LLU
will be reinforced by a high level of competition between technological platforms, as predicted in
Remark 2.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the signs and signiﬁcance of the estimated parameters remain
fairly constant across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations estimated. In particular, for models (3), (4) and
(5), the outcome of the Hausman test reveals that the instrumental variable speciﬁcation seems
to be the one consistent with data. In fact, in all the cases the null hypotheses that there is no
systematic diﬀerence between the RE and IV estimators is rejected. This conﬁrms the concerns
about the possible endogeneity of the computed inter and intra-platform competition indices and
suggests the need of instrumenting them.26
6 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the distinct roles played by inter-platform and intra-platform competition
in stimulating broadband adoption. This is a highly debated issue in the digital economy among
25Note that our analysis does not take into account any social welfare consideration; clearly, in order to evaluate
the social welfare implications of promoting competition across platform one should also take into account the ﬁxed
costs entailed by rolling down cable or other alternative networks.
26The FE and RE regressions give very similar outcomes, and the related Hausman test for the hypothesis of no
diﬀerence between the two estimators does not reject the null in two cases out of three, namely models (3) and (5).
17both practitioners and policy makers.
While stimulating entry into the DSL segment of the market through appropriate regulatory
policies, such as local loop unbundling, is generally less problematic then enticing entry into alter-
native platforms (typically cable and ﬁber optics), it is still very much unclear which is the most
eﬀective way to proceed in order to speed up broadband adoption.
By moving from a simple model of oligopolistic competition between access providers of diﬀerent
platforms, we explicitly estimate the impact of intra-platform and inter-platform competition on
broadband uptake. Our empirical evidence, based on data for 14 European countries, conﬁrms the
theoretical predictions of the model; in particular, our results emphasize the role of stronger com-
petition across technologies as the main driver to stimulate broadband adoption. Conversely, the
enhanced competition within the DSL segment of the market does not seem to have played a similar
role; furthermore, we have also shown, both theoretically and empirically, that there are positive
synergies to be exploited between policies directed to induce more inter-platform competition and
those directed towards local loop unbundling.
We view our results as a ﬁrst step at understanding the eﬀects of various forms of competition
on broadband adoption. The adoption process is clearly at its early stages; should more complete
data become available, we will investigate further on these complex relationships.
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20Appendix
The relationship between HHIinter and the level of competition m and n. In this section we discuss
how the Herﬁndhal index for inter-platform concentration, deﬁned in (2), varies when the number
of ﬁrms in the two segments of the market change. By assumption, we restrict the attention to the









We want to characterise the sign of this diﬀerential. Two cases emerge: i) DSL is the dominant
technology, Q > Y and ii) cable dominates, Y > Q.
We start with case i), which is the current situation in most countries; in our symmetric equilibrium,
it must be that ±HHIinter
±n > 0 and ±HHIinter
±m < 0: an increase in the number of DSL ﬁrms induces
the market to tip even further towards DSL while an increase in the number of cable ﬁrms makes
technologies more evenly adopted. Therefore, from expression (6):









Using the equilibrium output values Q and Y given in (1), we can compute HHIinter:
HHIinter =
(mn°)2 ¡
c2 + 2®2 ¡ 2c®
¢
¡ 2®mn(2mn + n + m)(® ¡ c)¯°




(n(m + 1)c)2 ¡ 2®n2 (m + 1)
2 c + ®2 ¡
2m2n2 + 2m2n + 2n2m + m2 + n2¢´
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(®(¯ (n + m) + 2mn(¯ ¡ °)) ¡ (¯ + m(¯ ¡ °))nc)
2 :




n(® ¡ c)[n®(¯ ¡ °) + c°n + ¯®]









n(® ¡ c)[n®(¯ ¡ °) + c°n + ¯®]
m®[(® ¡ c)¯(m + 1) ¡ °®m)]
:
G is positive for any admissible value of the local loop unbundling cost, c.27 Therefore,
dHHIinter < 0 when dn=dm is small enough, namely when m increases relatively more than n;
in this case, both Q and Y increase but cable market increases relatively to DSL and, consequently,
concentration decreases. HHIinter increases when the opposite occurs.
27It can be shown, but the intuition is straightforward, that when the price of LLU is too high, the market for




21Case ii) occurs when cable is the dominant technology, Y > Q. In this case, as dn > 0 and dm > 0,
the Herﬁndhal index varies with an opposite sign: ±HHIinter
±n < 0 and ±HHIinter
±m > 0; an increase in
the number of cable ﬁrms induces the market to tip even further towards cable while an increase
in the number of DSL ﬁrms makes technologies more evenly adopted. Therefore, the discussion on
dHHIinter follows the same lines as above, although with reversed inequalities, and it is omitted
for brevity.
Summarizing, as the number of providers gets larger, inter-platform competition increases as long
as the market for the dominant technology experiences an increase in the number of ﬁrms which is
smaller than the increase in the market for the alternative platform. ¤




n(¯(m + 1) ¡ °m)
¯2 (1 + n)(1 + m) ¡ °2mn
< 0: (8)
Since ¯ > ° and n > m, the above condition is always satisﬁed. ¤





This inequality holds when the variations d(dBB
dc ) and dHHIinter are of the same sign. The sign of
dHHIinter has been already determined in the ﬁrst section of the Appendix.
In order to investigate the sign of d(dBB








(¯ + m(¯ ¡ °))¯2 (m + 1)
(¯2(m + n + nm) + mn(¯2 ¡ °2))
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2 dm: (9)
From this expression, it is clear that d(dBB




n°(¯ + n(¯ ¡ °))
¯(m + 1)(¯ + m(¯ ¡ °))
;
and it is negative otherwise. Let
G =
n°(¯ + n(¯ ¡ °))
¯(m + 1)(¯ + m(¯ ¡ °))
:
Through simple algebraic manipulations, it can be shown that for any admissible value of the
parameters, G > G > 0, where G has been deﬁned in the ﬁrst section of the Appendix.28 Therefore
28Formally, this inequality is veriﬁed for any c · ¯ c. The proof of this statement is quite long and it is therefore






when G < dn
dm < G. This proves the remark. ¤
Proof of Remark 3. We need to show that, when markets become less concentrated (dHHIintra < 0
and dHHIinter < 0) the equilibrium number of broadband access lines increases, i.e. dBB > 0.
We start with inter-platform concentration: from the results in the ﬁrst section of the Appendix,
we know that dHHIinter < 0 when dn=dm < G.
Consider now total broadband access BB; taking the total diﬀerential of (1) and rearranging we
obtain:
dBB =
¯ (¯ + m(¯ ¡ °))(¯ (® ¡ c)(m + 1) ¡ ®° m)
(°2mn ¡ ¯2 (n + 1)(m + 1))
2 dn +
¯ (¯ + n(¯ ¡ °))(¯® ¡ ®°n + ¯n® + c°n)
(°2mn ¡ ¯2 (n + 1)(m + 1))
2 dm:
From visual inspection is easy to verify that, when dn > 0 and dm > 0, dBB > 0 for any admissible
value of c.
Therefore, when dHHIinter < 0, dBB > 0: this prove the ﬁrst part of the remark.
Consider the impact of intra-platform competition. As seen above, dBB > 0 when the number of
DSL and cable ﬁrms increase; since dHHIintra < 0 when dn > 0, then dBB=dHHIintra < 0. ¤
Proof of Corollary 1. When both the cable and the DSL segments of the market become more
competitive, i.e. dn > 0 and dm > 0, then inter-platform competition is more eﬀective then






) dHHIinter > dHHIintra:






















From the ﬁrst section of the Appendix, we know that dHHIinter < 0 for dn






. It is clear that, for any n > 0, G > ˜ G; therefore, for ˜ G < dn
dm < G, Corollary 1 is
satisﬁed. ¤
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